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Abstract
Human service agencies are encouraged to collaborate with other public and private agencies in
providing services to children and families. However, they also often compete with these same
partners for funding, qualified staff, and clientele. Although little is known about complex
interagency dynamics of competition and collaboration in the child-serving sector, evidence
suggests that competition can undermine collaboration unless managed strategically. This study
explores the interrelationship between competition and collaboration, sometimes referred to as
“co-opetition.” Using a national dataset of private child and family serving agencies, we examine
their relationships with other child serving sectors (N=4460 pair-wise relationships), and explore
how variations in patterns of collaboration and competition are associated with several
organizational, environmental and relational factors. Results suggest that most relationships
between private child welfare agencies and other child serving agencies are characterized by both
competition and collaboration (i.e. “co-opetition”), and is most frequently reported with other
local private child welfare agencies. Logistic regression analyses indicate that co-opetition is
likely to occur when private child welfare agencies have a good perceived relationship or a sub-
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contract with their partner. Findings have implications for how agency leaders manage partner
relationships, and how public child welfare administrators structure contracts.
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1. Introduction
Private child welfare agencies play a pivotal role in responding to the needs of children at
risk for maltreatment as greater responsibility for delivering frontline child welfare case
management services (e.g. developing case plans, assessing progress towards goals) is
shifted to the private sector (Collins-Camargo, Ensign, & Flaherty, 2007; McCullough &
Schmitt, 2000). To meet the complex needs of families involved in the child welfare system
and enhance system accountability, private child welfare agencies must collaborate with
other child-serving agencies (Waldfogel, 1998). Collaboration may entail case planning with
clinicians from multiple agencies, co-locating services, developing a joint program, or
pooling human resource functions.
However, selecting a partner, negotiating the relationship, and maintaining collaborative
partnerships may be challenging, since private child welfare agencies also often compete
with these same partners for resources. Competition between agency partners may
undermine collaboration: a private child welfare agency’s success in winning a new contract
or grant, hiring qualified personnel, or recruiting new clients could be at their partners’
expense, contributing to relationship strain, failure, or dissolution (Baker, Faulkner, &
Fisher, 1998). Based on this traditional, zero-sum view of competition and collaboration,
agencies may avoid collaborating with a competitor, which could be detrimental to the
families they serve given the importance of partnering with other child-serving agencies to
deliver comprehensive and coordinated care.
In practice, however, there are many examples of how organizational leaders have moved
beyond the traditional “Clobber or Collaborate” view (Zuckerman, 2006), suggesting the
need for re-conceptualizing collaboration and competition as interrelated or interdependent
concepts (Chen, 2008). Organizations may manage “co-opetition” with a partner by
collaborating in one domain while simultaneously competing in another (Bengtsson &
Kock, 2000). In fact, in their seminal book, Brandenburger and Nalebuff (1996) advance co-
opetition as a business strategy where combining efforts and resources with a competitor
may create value by improving efficiency and quality. Co-opetition is also evident within
human service delivery systems. Emerging evidence from children’s service delivery
systems suggests that the more agencies compete with one another, the more likely they are
to collaborate (Bunger, 2013; Valente, Coronges, Stevens, & Cousineau, 2008).
Among agencies that serve children and families involved with child welfare systems,
privatization of core child welfare services may create greater need for collaboration locally
among independent agencies competing for similar resources. Pooling resources and efforts
among competing child-serving agencies may create efficiencies in the administration and
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delivery of services, while expanding the availability and accessibility of comprehensive
services for youth and their families. Therefore, co-opetition among child serving agencies
has potential to benefit both organizations and the families they serve. However, before the
field tests the impact of these dynamics on organizational and system performance, a better
understanding of the ways child-serving agencies collaborate and compete with specific
types of partners is needed. Specifically, what remains unexplored is the extent to which
these complex, co-opetive relationship dynamics occur, with which types of partners, around
what types of activities, and under what conditions.
This study profiles the overlapping collaborative and competitive dynamics between private
child welfare agencies and other child-serving agencies by examining the prevalence and
predictors of co-opetition. To capture variations, features, and relevant drivers of co-
opetition that are unique to each other sector, we focus on relationships. We next briefly
review the extant literature on collaboration, competition, and co-opetition to examine the
question of why and under what conditions private child welfare agencies may collaborate
with a competitor.
1.1. Collaboration
Collaboration is a type of interorganizational relationship where partners work toward a
common goal (Gray, 1989). Collaboration involves significant investment, adjustments in
the way partners operate in response to one another, and the risk of lost autonomy (Bailey &
Koney, 2000). Agencies collaborate around both service delivery and administrative
functions (Bolland & Wilson, 1994). Through service delivery collaboration, agencies align
their programmatic offerings via a variety of activities including client referrals, joint service
programming, and/or sharing data across organizations to ensure that both partners have
complete and updated information about their shared clients. Partners also align their
operational infrastructure and administrative functions by sharing responsibility or resources
for financial allocation and budgeting, human resource functions, billing, staff training, or
other support functions (Shortell, Gillies, Anderson, Erickson, & Mitchell, 2000). For
example, some agencies may develop formal coalitions or umbrella organizations that
provide administrative functions for members, such as staff training, proposal writing and
quality assurance activities (Cefola, Brotsky, & Hanson, 2010).
Within the human services, agencies generally collaborate with partners that serve similar
client populations (Bolland & Wilson, 1994; Rivard & Morrissey, 2003) for a variety of
reasons including access to needed resources like funding, client referrals, or complementary
services (Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003). Agencies may also collaborate by pooling their
administrative resources including staff or space to create efficiencies of scale (Guo & Acar,
2005). Strong pressure from funders, accrediting bodies, policymakers, and other key
external stakeholders may also cause agencies to develop collaborative relationships and
share resources as a way of gaining legitimacy (Reitan, 1998).
1.2. Competition
Competition emerges when there is demand for limited resources by multiple organizations
(Barman, 2002; Hunt, 1997). For instance, a grant, contract, key staff person, or group of
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clients won by an agency may reduce the resources available for other organizations, all else
being equal (Bengtsson & Kock, 2000). Competition among agencies is influenced by both
the supply of needed resources and the number of agencies demanding those resources.
Private child welfare agencies may encounter competition with other child serving agencies
that rely on the same or similar financial and human resources, and can lead to conflict,
hardship, or going out of business. For example, when the number of children in out-of-
home care was drastically reduced in Illinois, some provider agencies were forced to close
their doors (McEwen, 2006).
1.3. Co-Opetition: Collaborating with a Competitor
Collaboration and competition have been traditionally viewed as opposing types of
interorganizational relationships (Chen, 2008) where competing agencies are unlikely to
collaborate (Park & Russo, 1996). When competitors collaborate, the risks of partnership are
particularly high: as agencies share resources, influence over those resources becomes
shared, with the result of potential loss of agency autonomy and independence. Therefore,
there is a risk that a partner will exploit another by gaining administrative control, exposing
vulnerabilities, and/or stealing innovations and reducing agency competitive advantage
(Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003). Thus, one risk is that a partner will behave opportunistically in
pursuit of its own success. Additional risk stems from potential economic or service delivery
failure by a partner, which may jeopardize the other agency in the partnership because of
increased reliance on one another. Despite the risks, evidence of collaboration among
competitors (co-opetition) in for-profit industries (Bengtsson & Kock, 1999), the arts
(Mariani, 2007), health care systems (Judge & Ryman, 2001; Zuckerman, 2006), and
nonprofit child service systems (Bunger, 2013; Valente, Coronges, Stevens, & Cousineau,
2008) suggests that collaboration and competition should be reconsidered as potentially
related interorganizational processes between any given pair of organizations (Chen, 2008).
Conceptualizing collaboration and competition as interrelated relational processes between
organizations opens the door to new questions about the prevalence, drivers, and impact of
co-opetition. As noted, organizations collaborate to access resources, create efficiencies, and
gain legitimacy. These benefits may be amplified by collaborating with a competitor, and
may in fact produce a distinct competitive advantage for co-opeting partners (Brandenburger
& Nalebuff, 1996). When pooling resources, competing agencies may create efficiencies
and economies of scale (Snavely & Tracy, 2002), enabling them to develop and
implemement new programs or products quickly (Gnyawali & Park, 2009; 2011), weather
turbulent or scarce funding environments, work through shortages of qualified staff in the
community, or manage other risks. For example, competing agencies may pool resources to
purchase a new data management system, or contribute proprietary knowledge to design a
new program. As a result, agencies may improve service delivery and performance, and may
find greater success in winning resources and legitimacy as collaborators than as individual
competitors. However, some have also argued that competing agencies collaborate
deliberately to reduce the negative impact of competition in the environment (Fligstein,
1996). Examples range from joint contract bids or grant proposals to extreme forms of
collusion and price fixing (Hunt, 2007).
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1.4. Variation in the Nature of Co-Opetitive Relationship Among Child-Serving Agencies
Given the risks and benefits of collaborating with a competitor, co-opetition may vary
depending on whether agencies are aligning their service delivery or administrative
functions. In particular, private child welfare agencies may be more likely to collaborate
with competitors around service delivery than administrative functions. Generally, service
delivery relationships tend to be more common than administrative relationships (Bolland &
Wilson, 1994; Johnsen & Morrissey, 1996), potentially because administrative partnerships
(shared funding, staff, etc.) involve a deeper and more prolonged commitment to a
partnership and heightened engagement in shared funding and governance functions.
Therefore, private child welfare agencies may hesitate to collaborate with their competitors
around administrative functions, or may only do so with a limited number of carefully vetted
partners.
The complexity of inter-agency dynamics may also vary based on the type of partner and the
degree to which their services are functionally distinct. For example, in other industries such
as health care (Peng & Bourne, 2009) and technology (Gnyawali & Park, 2011),
organizations collaborate with competitors that have complementary (as opposed to
common or shared) resources, capabilities, and strengths that are considered valuable and
essential to producing outcomes. By that logic, private child welfare agencies may be less
likely to collaborate with a direct competitor from within the child welfare sector than a
competitor in another child-serving sector that delivers different, or complementary services
such as mental health, substance abuse or juvenile justice. Therefore, there may be little
benefit to collaborating with a competitor within the same child welfare sector (including
public and other private child welfare agencies).
Although evidence suggests that agencies may be more likely to collaborate with
competitors across rather than within the same sector, these patterns may not hold true in
child welfare systems. Private child welfare agencies may be especially likely to collaborate
with competing organizations from the same sector because of strong institutional pressures
from public policymakers and agencies that value collaboration (Jang & Feiock, 2007).
Private agencies are expected to collaboratively promote child safety, permanency and
wellbeing (USGAO, 2003), and are held accountable for their partnerships with other child
welfare agencies regardless of whether they are competitors. As a result, this institutional
pressure to collaborate may lead private agencies to partner with their competitors out of
compliance, creating complex co-relational dynamics within child welfare sectors that have
not yet been explored.
1.5. Drivers of Co-Opetition
Although evidence suggests that private child welfare and other human service organizations
collaborate with their competition, the conditions that give rise to these relationships are
largely unknown. Drawing from limited research on co-opetition in other industries, and the
broader knowledge about interorganizational relationships, co-opetition may be driven by a
variety of organizational, geographic and relational features.
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First, specific organizational features may lead some agencies to collaborate with a
competitor. For example, organizational age and size may be related to co-opetition, where
older and larger agencies are more likely to be involved in a variety of complex relationships
(Foster & Meinhard, 2002; Guo & Acar, 2005; Gnyawali & Park, 2011), particularly if they
are familiar with the organizational ecology of local service provision. Over time, agencies
become more familiar, connect, and learn how to form and manage relationships with other
organizations in a historically-shared marketplace. In addition, larger agencies with more
resources to share may be especially attractive partners compared to small organizations
because they can offer a variety of capacities and services to complement a partner, and
therefore typically have extensive relationships with other organizations (Foster &
Meinhard, 2002; Wholey & Huonker, 1993). As a result, co-opetition may be more common
among older and larger agencies that have well-established networks and past experience
managing complex inter-agency dynamics.
Also, agencies’ tax-exempt status may influence whether they engage in co-opetition with
other child-serving agencies. For-profit agencies operating in humans service sectors may
experience competition more acutely than nonprofits (which tend to be favored by public
funders, and which may be less reliant on fee-for-service funding) (Tuckman, 1998). In
addition, for-profit agencies may avoid risky and costly collaborative arrangements since
profits and returns are a chief consideration in strategic decisions. Therefore, co-opetiton
may be less common among for-profit than nonprofit private child welfare agencies.
Second, the broader organizational environment may influence co-opetition patterns. First,
geographic context may influence co-opetition especially in urban metropolitan areas.
Subcontracts tend to be more plentiful and available for private child welfare agencies in
urban compared to non-urban areas (USDHHS, 2001), inviting more agencies to work and
collaborate within the child welfare system. However, metropolitan regions also tend to
have a high density of providers competing for the same pool of resources. Therefore,
agencies located in metropolitan markets may experience greater competition than those in
suburban and rural regions, which often have fewer agencies vying for the same resources
(Girth, Hefetz, Johnston, & Warner, 2012); as a result, co-opetition may be most common in
metropolitan areas. In addition, the administrative structure of child welfare services may
also influence interagency dynamics in general. In most states, administrative responsibility
for child welfare services (which includes activities related to contracting with private child
welfare agencies) is centralized through the state. However in nine states (California,
Colorado, Minnesota, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and
Virginia), child welfare administration is decentralized through county-based agencies, and
in three states (Maryland, Nevada and Wisconsin) services are administered using a hybrid
approach (Child Welfare Information Gateway, 2012). This structural arrangement may
affect the number of public entities actively contracting with and availability of resources for
private child welfare agencies within a region, thus shaping competition among agencies.
However, whether and how administrative structures for child welfare services influence
interactions among agencies in general, and co-opetition specifically, remain unexplored.
Finally, specific relational features between partners may open the door to co-opetition by
reducing the risks associated with collaborating with a competitor. As noted, by
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collaborating with a competitor, an agency risks exposure to opportunistic behavior by a
partner. These risks may be lower in the context of relationships where there are formal or
informal safeguards in place. Human service agencies often work with one another in the
context of a formal contract outlining partners’ roles, responsibilities, and accountability
mechanisms (Smith & Lipsky, 1993). These formal structures may help reduce perceived
risks of co-opetition. However, some relationship safeguards are informal, as in the case of
high quality, trust-based relationships. In trust-based relationships, social norms that
emphasize respect, reciprocity, and mutual accountability may also act as a buffer against
the risks of co-opetition (Romzek, LeRoux, Johnston, Kempf & Piatek, 2013). As a result,
relationships safeguarded by formal agreements, or high-quality, trust-based partnerships
may be more likely to be co-opetitive.
1.6. Study Purpose
Currently, little is known about the extent to which co-opetition occurs among child-serving
agencies, the types of partners most likely to experience co-opetition, and the conditions that
give rise to co-opetitive dynamics. The scope, variation, and drivers of these complex
dynamics between private child welfare agencies and other child serving agencies are likely
to be unique to each pair of partners. Previous studies of co-opetition have drawn from
anecdotal reports and case studies (e.g. Bengtsson & Kock, 2000; Peng & Bourne, 2009),
and cross-sectional studies demonstrating evidence of a positive association between
collaboration and competition (e.g. Bunger, 2013; Valente et al, 2008; Mascia & Di
Vincenzo, 2013), which do not account for the unique combinations or relational features of
pair-wise partnerships. Nor have studies to date measured the overlap of collaboration and
competition explicitly within the context of organizational dyads—the organizational unit of
analysis that is most appropriately suited for examination of interorganizational dynamics
involving partnership among competitors.
The purpose of this study is to explore the interrelationship between collaboration and
competition between private child welfare agencies and other child-serving sectors. We
focus on these pair-wise (dyadic) relationships among partners to account for the unique
features and conditions of each dyad to examine (1) the prevalence of collaborative,
competitive, and co-opetitive relationships between different child and family serving
agencies, and (2) the drivers of co-opetition. Understanding the prevalence of co-opetition
and the conditions under which it occurs can inform how agency leaders select partners and
structure strategic alliances.
2. Methods
2.1. Data Source and Sample
The National Survey of Private Child and Family Serving Agencies (NSPCFSA) is the first
national survey of private agencies involved with the formal child welfare system. The
survey was developed in 2011 by the National Quality Improvement Center on the
Privatization of Child Welfare Services in partnership with the Child Welfare League of
America (CWLA) and the Alliance for Children and Families to provide detailed
information in the following seven domains: director characteristics, organizational
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demographics, agency funding, service array, inter-organizational relationships, internal and
external pressures on organizational maintenance, and performance measurement and
management. Survey content was developed based on review of the empirical literature as
well as prior research conducted by study investigators.
The NSPCFSA sampling frame included all private agencies registered on the membership
listservs of CWLA, the Alliance for Children and Families, and state associations for
children and families involved in the National Organization of State Associations for
Children (NOSAC). Invitations to participate in the survey were sent directly by CWLA, the
Alliance for Children and Families, and NOSAC. The email invitation for the survey
detailed the study’s purpose, information necessary for informed consent, and a hyperlink to
the survey. A limit of one response per agency was requested. Data were collected from 446
private agency directors in 38 states between May and June 2011. Given the anonymous
recruitment of participating agencies through listservs, an exact response rate could not be
calculated. The response rate would be 45% if there were no overlap in association
membership. However, about 40% of agencies reported membership in more than one
association, therefore we estimate that the response rate may be as high as 74%. Additional
details on NSPCFSA sampling plan, procedures, and sample characteristics are available
elsewhere (McBeath, Collins-Camargo, & Chuang, 2012).
In the current study, given our interest in relationships between private child welfare
agencies and other service sectors, the dyad (a pairwise relationship between an individual
private child welfare agency and one other sector) was the unit of analysis. Each relationship
could serve a distinct purpose, and therefore could be negotiated and structured differently
to account for the unique combination of the agency and its partner. A dyadic approach
allowed for exploration of relationship types, and testing associations with other relationship
characteristics while accounting for the heterogeneity by sector (Valente, 2010). Data were
reshaped from the agency to the dyadic unit of analysis where each observation in the data
file represented a unique pairwise relationship between an individual private child welfare
agency and one other sector. Procedures for transforming the original agency data file into a
dyadic file were similar to those for reshaping longitudinal data from “wide” to “long”
format (as described in Valente, 2010, p. 50–59). Since each agency (n=446) reported on
their relationships with 10 other sectors, there were 4460 possible dyadic observations (446
× 10). Observations with missing data were not included in analysis.
2.2. Measures
2.2.1. Relationship Patterns (Dependent Variables)—Agencies reported on
collaboration and competition with 10 other child-serving sectors. First, agencies reported
on the frequency of competition with ten other sectors for public and private funds, staff,
and clientele. If agencies reported competition for at least one resource, they were
considered competitors. Next, agencies reported on the frequency of collaboration around
four organizational functions: data sharing, joint service delivery, joint budgeting, and staff
cross-training.
In the present study, responses to the competition and collaboration items were used to
create nominal variables to describe relationship types around the four collaborative
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activities. To address our first research question about the prevalence of relationship types, a
nominal variable was created for each of the four organizational functions (data sharing,
joint service delivery, joint budgeting, and staff cross-training). Consistent with Bengtsson
and Kock (2000), categories for each of these nominal variables represented four possible
combinations regarding the presence or absence of collaboration and competition: neither
competitors nor collaborators; competitors but not collaborators; collaborators but not
competitors; and competitors and collaborators (co-opetition). For example, with respect to
the variable created for data sharing relationships: relationships where agencies were not
competitors and did not share data were categorized as “no relationship” since there was no
interaction. Second, relationships where agencies were competitors and did not share data
were categorized as “competition, no collaboration.” Third, relationships where agencies
were not competitors and shared data were categorized as “collaboration, no competition.”
Finally, relationships in which agencies were competitors and shared data were identified as
“co-opetition.” To address the second research question regarding agency, relational, and
geographic characteristics affecting co-opetition, these four relationship pattern variables
were combined into a single dichotomous variable (co-opetition versus the other three
relationship types).
2.2.2. Partner Types—Agency directors answered questions about their relationships
with ten different partner sectors (public child welfare agencies, local private child welfare
agencies, non-local private child welfare agencies, courts, mental health, substance abuse
treatment, police, juvenile justice, schools, and public welfare). When data were reshaped at
the dyadic level, partner type was included as a nominal variable, where local private child
welfare agencies served as the referent in multivariate analyses.
2.2.3. Drivers of Co-Opetition
Organizational Characteristics: Three variables (agency age, size, and tax-exempt status)
captured organizational characteristics that potentially drive co-opetition (Foster &
Meinhard, 2002). Agency age was measured as the number of years since the agency was
established. Agency size was operationalized as the director’s report of staff size and
measured as a 9-point categorical variable, ranging from 1 = < 10 full-time employees to 9 =
> 1,000 full-time employees. A binary variable reflected whether an agency held nonprofit
or for-profit status.
Environmental Features: Two variables captured environmental features. The agency’s
geographic location was measured as three binary variables representing metropolitan,
urban, and suburban regions) since agencies may operate in more than geographic location.
In addition, one binary variable captured whether the agency operated in a county-
administered system (=1).
Relational Features: Two variables measured the agency relationship features (formal and
informal safeguards) as reported by the director. The first variable captured whether the
relationship between the private child welfare agency and its partner involved a formal
subcontract with a binary measure (=1). The second variable measured the perceived
relationship quality with each partner. Respondents were asked to rate their agency’s
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relationship with other service agencies using a 5-point Likert scale where “1” = “It is very
poor”, “2” =”It is poor”, “3” = “It is neither poor nor good”, “4”= “It is good”, and “5”= “It
is very good”. Low scores indicate poor relationships and higher scores indicate high quality
trust-based relationships.
2.4. Analysis
Prevalence and patterns of relationships by partner type were explored using univariate and
bivariate analyses (cross-tabulations). Logistic regression was used to further examine
partner types and identify organizational, environmental and relational features associated
with co-opetition. Four separate multivariate models examined factors associated with co-
opetition around each organizational function: data sharing, joint service delivery, joint
budgeting, and staff cross-training, respectively. The unit of analysis was the pair-wise
relationship between each agency and ten child-serving sectors, therefore each agency was
represented up to ten times in the data. To accommodate the non-independence of these
data, standard errors were estimated using jackknife procedures clustered by agency
(Snijders & Borgatti, 1999). Partner type was entered as a factor variable in the models. For
all models, Hosmer-Lemeshow tests demonstrated adequate fit (NS). All data management
and analyses were conducted using Stata 12.0 (StataCorp, 2011).
3. Results
3.1. Agency and Relationship Characteristics
Descriptive information about sample private child welfare agencies and their relationships
with other sectors is presented in Tables 1 and 2 (respectively). Most responding agencies
were medium sized in terms of staff (mean = 4.5; 50–100 staff), nonprofit (92%), and
ranged in age from two to 212 years. More respondents had offices or affiliates located in
suburban (60%) or metropolitan (65%) regions than rural areas (39%). Fewer than half
(46%) operated in county-administered child welfare systems. At the dyadic level, private
child welfare agency directors perceived that the quality of their relationships with other
child-serving sectors was good (mean=3.96, SD=0.77), and about a third of the relationships
included a contract.
3.2. Prevalence of Collaboration, Competition, and Co-Opetition
Collaboration around at least one organizational function was reported in a great proportion
(87%) of reported relationships between private child welfare agencies and other child-
serving sectors. Data sharing (81%) and joint service delivery (76%) were most common,
while joint budgeting (35%) and staff cross training (56%) were less frequent. Competition
was also common, and reported in nearly three-quarters (74%) of all relationships between
child welfare agencies and the other child-serving sectors.
Given the high prevalence of collaboration and competition, it is not surprising that most
relationships with other child-serving sectors were characterized by co-opetition (Figure 1).
The exception was joint budgeting and resource allocation, in which agencies did not
collaborate frequently. Agencies were more likely to share data and deliver joint services
(organizational functions central to direct family care) in the absence of competition. On the
Bunger et al. Page 10






















other hand agencies were less likely to cross-train staff or budget jointly (central to
administrative operations) and these relationships were more likely to be categorized as
“competition, no collaboration.”
3.3. Variation of Relationship Patterns by Partner (Bivariate)
Cross-tabulations of relationships around organizational functions for each partner type are
displayed in Tables 3 and 4. Private child welfare agencies’ relationships with all partner
types were characterized by a high prevalence of co-opetition. The exceptions were private
child welfare agencies’ ties with police and public welfare, which were frequently
categorized as neither collaborative nor competitive. Also, nearly all reported data sharing
relationships with public child welfare agencies were among non-competitors (88%)
suggesting less competition than with other partner types.
As noted previously, joint budgeting relationships were rare, and most relationships were
among competitors who did not collaborate in this area. However, budgeting partnerships
were more likely to be co-opetitive within the child welfare sector (specifically with public
and local private child welfare agencies), and with schools than with other partners. Overall,
results suggest the high prevalence of co-opetition, with some variation depending on the
type of collaboration and partner.
3.4. Partner Type and Other Drivers of Co-Opetition (Multivariate Analyses)
The specific influence of partner type and other drivers on the likelihood of reported co-
opetition was tested using multivariate logistic regressions (Table 5). Since the prevalence of
co-opetition with other local private child welfare agencies was among the highest across all
four organizational functions, this partner type was used as the referent. Therefore, results
illustrate higher or lower odds of co-opetition with a particular partner relative to other local
private child welfare agencies.
Models classified 72–76% of all relationships correctly. Results confirm the high prevalence
of co-opetition between private child welfare agencies and their local counterparts within the
same sector. Relationships between private child welfare agencies and most other partner
types across sector were significantly less likely to be characterized by co-opetition.
Several organizational and relational features were also significantly associated with co-
opetition. Among the agency characteristics tested, staff size was positively associated with
co-opetition across all four organizational functions, whereas relationships between larger
private agencies with more staff and their child-serving partners were more likely to be
characterized by co-opetition. In addition, for-profit status was negatively associated with
co-opetition but only for staff cross-training (OR=.43, SE=.13, p<.01). Both contracts and
relationship quality were positively associated with co-opetition for all four organizational
functions. Relationships between private child welfare agencies and their partners
characterized by the presence of a sub-contract and perceived relationship quality were
positive predictors of most reported relationships. For example having a subcontract
(OR=2.36, SE=.31, p<.001) and relationship quality (OR=1.85, SE=.16, p<.001) was
positively associated with co-opetition in data sharing. Of note, both contracting and
relationship quality had the strongest positive relationship with co-opetition. However, co-
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opetition was not significantly associated with agency age, geographic location, or county-
administered system.
4. Discussion
This study examined competitive and collaborative relationships between private child and
family serving agencies and their partners. Findings demonstrate that private child welfare
agencies manage collaboration and competition simultaneously in most of their
interorganizational relationships with other child-serving sectors but are most likely to
experience co-opetition within their own sector (i.e., with other local private child welfare
agencies). Co-opetition was more likely among larger private child welfare agencies, with
subcontracted partners, and in the context of high quality working relationships.
Our findings contribute to emerging evidence of how children’s service organizations often
manage complex interorganizational relationships (Bunger, 2013; Valente et al., 2008);
however, this complexity may be most likely to occur within the context of service delivery.
Relationships involving data sharing and joint service delivery in particular were likely to be
characterized by co-opetition, suggesting that private child welfare agencies may be able to
maintain complex relationships with their partners in order to deliver services to clients. On
the other hand and in keeping with findings from prior studies of human service
partnerships, administrative collaboration was less common than service delivery
collaboration (Johnsen & Morrissey, 1996; Provan & Milward, 1995). Collaboration around
administrative operations may be particularly risky for organizations and therefore less
frequent in general, and much less likely to occur with a direct competitor.
This study finds evidence that these relationship dynamics vary by partner type. Private
child welfare agencies were most likely to experience co-opetition with other local private
child welfare agencies within the sector. Prior evidence in other industries (e.g., Gnyawali &
Park, 2011) suggests that complementary and distinct services and capacities bring
competing agencies together. Although private child welfare agencies may compete with
other private agencies in the same market for resources given that they often provide
overlapping services, findings from the current study suggest that they nevertheless do
collaborate with one another, indicating that these agencies may have identified more
specific complementary resources and capacities besides an obvious distinction in services.
The current study also identified relational features as a key driver of co-opetition. The
quality and subcontract status of the relationship were both positively associated with
private agencies’ ability to collaborate with a competitor. Higher quality relationships result
from a working history among partners, which may result in greater trust and mitigate risks
related to competition (Romzek et al., 2013). Having a formal contract that outlines roles
and responsibilities for each partner may also offer protection from the risk of working with
a competitor.
Finally, findings suggest that the larger the private child welfare agencies, the more likely
their relationships will be characterized by co-opetition. Larger agencies tend to be
generalists that provide a variety of services to a broad geographic market, and are capable
of maintaining more partnerships than smaller, niche agencies (Wholey & Huonker, 1993).
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As a result, large organizations might be in direct competition with many other child-serving
sectors for funds, clients, and personnel, and thus be more likely to encounter co-opetition.
4.1. Implications for Management and Administration
These findings have implications for directors and managers of private and public child
welfare agencies. Private agencies may consider developing a mixed “portfolio” of
relationships that represent a diversity of collaborative, competitive, and co-opetitive
partnerships (Bengtsson & Kock, 1999) that specifically build agency capacity and strategic
advantage (Hunt, 1997). Building co-opetitive relationships within this portfolio might be
particularly important for leaders of small agencies, which may be less likely to collaborate
with competitors than their larger counterparts (as evidenced in this study), may have
limited capacity for more sophisticated administrative functions and infrastructure, and may
experience a disadvantage when competing for contracts. In some jurisdictions, local
agencies providing similar services (thus competing) form coalitions in which an umbrella
agency provides administrative functions for its members, enabling agencies to redirect
resources toward other services or initiatives (Armstrong, Swank, Strozier, Yampolskaya, &
Sharrock, 2013).
Given the frequency of co-opetition, leaders must also safeguard their agencies from the risk
of partnering with a competitor. Although the overall quality of relationships in the current
study was perceived as good, only 33.5% of agency relationships had a contract. The
protection of a formal contract, or careful selection of trustworthy partners with a history of
collaboration, can mitigate the risks of co-opetition (Bunger, 2013; Snavely & Tracy, 2002),
and may be especially important in the context of public-private partnerships in child
welfare (Crystal Collins-Camargo, Armstrong, McBeath, & Chuang, 2013).
The current study provides some insight for public child welfare administrators and system
planners who often struggle to provide leadership or navigate competition within a market-
driven provider pool while promoting collaboration to ensure an effective and responsive
service array (Collins-Camargo, McBeath, & Ensign, 2011). These findings imply that
administrators promoting reform do not need to encourage children’s agencies to work
together since they already do, and in fairly complex ways. Instead, administrators might
structure resource infusions in ways that build on rather than undermine these ties. Through
procurement processes, administrators may influence the balance of competition and
collaboration among private child welfare agencies. For example, openness to joint
proposals or bids, or adjusting the length of contract periods, may alter relational dynamics
(Kettner & Martin, 1989). It should be noted that increasing co-opetition may further reduce
direct competition for contracts and grants among social service agencies (Smith & Smyth,
1996) by creating a monopoly among a small group of large, well-supported collaborating
agencies. Generally, little research has investigated the impact of these contracting strategies
on relational dynamics among private child-serving agencies or how they may be used to
strike the optimal balance of collaboration and competition within a market. However, these
results have the potential to inform meaningful contract improvement interventions
consistent with the Children’s Bureau’s vision of developing collective impact strategies that
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harness investment and move toward collaborative reform in child welfare systems (Mitchell
et al., 2012).
4.2. Limitations and Future Research Directions
This study’s findings should be interpreted in light of limitations. First, the external validity
of the NSPCFSA sample may be limited. Private child welfare agencies were recruited
through listservs of national and state associations representing private child and family
service agencies. Thus, it is likely that agencies in the sample over-represent members of
these associations and states where associations are located. Also, smaller niche agencies
may be under-represented in this sample, perhaps because these agencies may have fewer
resources to support the fees required for membership in large professional associations and
advocacy coalitions (Mosley, 2011). As a result, the prevalence of co-opetition may have
been inflated in this study since small agencies might have been under-represented. In
addition, listwise deletion implemented in the predictors could have potentially introduced
item-response bias in the sample.
Second, measurement validity may be limited due to reliance on self-reported data. It is
plausible that recall bias was present for some of the items influencing the accuracy of
relationship categorization and prevalence of co-opetition. In addition, only a single measure
of the perceived quality of the partner relationship was included in the NSPCFSA survey.
This measure reflects a general perceived view of the director on the agency’s relationship
quality across partner types. It does not take into account any potential variation across the
four organizational functions of co-opetition included in this study. Also, it does not include
the perspectives of frontline workers and local partners, which may differ from those of
managers.
Also, agency directors were asked about their agency’s degree of competition for several
resources (e.g., funding, staffing) and these responses were used to identify the presence of
competition within each relationship. It is possible that the treatment of competition
responses masked additional variation in relationship patterns by the basis of competition.
Third, the cross-sectional design limits our understanding of how and why relationship
dynamics emerge and are maintained. Over time, relationships may evolve or dissolve in
response to competition, pressure to collaborate, or other forces. We were not able to capture
these time-based trends.
Finally, there is a possibility for potential residual confounding from unmeasured factors.
Measures of relevant factors that may have an impact on co-opetition were not included in
the NSPCFSA survey and thus not available for analysis. These factors include gaps in
expertise and/or service technology (Quintana-Garcia & Benavides-Velasco, 2004) and
state-level regulations related to organizational functions such as data-sharing. The inclusion
of these measures in the regression models might have provided a more precise examination
of the associations between partner types and co-opetition patterns. Nevertheless, while this
study cannot establish causality, it does elucidate potential associations that deserve
attention and further research.
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Despite its limitations, the dataset used in this study is the only national survey on private
child welfare agencies to date and is the best available source of information about the
relationship patterns among private child welfare agencies. Moreover, by examining
pairwise relationships, the features of agencies and their partners, environment, and
relationship conditions unique to each partnership could be considered simultaneously.
Study findings highlight new questions about how and why complex interactions emerge
among child-serving agencies, the use of trust-based or contractual structures for managing
and maintaining productive and positive partnerships, and how organizations adjust their
operations and services in response. For example, specific features of the system-level
environment that drive co-opetition among child serving agencies are still unknown. None
of the environmental features measured in this study were associated with co-opetition,
suggesting that an alternative set of external conditions may be worthy of further
investigation. Also, findings demonstrate the frequency of formal and informal safeguards
(whether through a contract or a high quality relationship) for engaging in co-opetition.
Future research on the effectiveness of these safeguards for protecting agency interests while
allowing partners the flexibility to adapt and adjust relative to one another would inform
how agency directors negotiate and structure their relationships with one another. Especially
given the potential instability of co-opetitive relationships, a longitudinal approach for
examining relationships among agency partners might illuminate the dynamic interplay
between competition and collaboration among agencies, and how relationships evolve and
dissolve in relation to internal features of agencies, qualities of the interorganizational
relationship, and broader characteristics of the agency environment.
Understanding the impact of inter-agency dynamics on organizational and client outcomes is
also necessary for informing effective policy, contracting, and agency management
decisions. Although co-opetition has been associated with product and service innovations
and efficiencies in other industries (Gnyawali & Park, 2009; 2011), the impact, advantages,
and consequences of co-opetition within human services is unknown. This study suggests
that child-serving agencies engage in co-opetition across sectors especially around joint
service delivery; future research could investigate whether these partnerships generate
innovations in programming and frontline service delivery. In addition, co-opetition around
budgeting and staff training is particularly high within-sector among private child welfare
agencies and their other private counterparts. These complex relationships could potentially
be leveraged to support implementation of evidence-based practices; pooling resources with
competitors may enable private child welfare agencies to purchase new practice models and
training supports. Investigating the use and effectiveness of co-opetitive relationships as an
implementation strategy could generate new ideas and insights for agency and system
leaders given the growing emphasis on evidence-based practices in child welfare.
Finally, the knowledge base has long suffered from mixed evidence of the effectiveness of
collaboration, and various system structures for improving child outcomes. As Wells (2006)
noted, this inconsistency may be due in part to unmeasured factors also influencing the
effectiveness of collaborative relationships. Because competition may prevent agencies from
collaborating intensively and achieving benefits for clients they serve, future studies
examining the influence of system structure on client level outcomes should also include
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measures of competition and co-opetition. Understanding the complexities of interactions
among service providers within and across systems may help unravel long-standing
questions about optimal service delivery configurations for children, youth, and families.
5. Conclusion
This study characterizes the complex strategic environment in which private child welfare
agencies operate by examining the intersection of collaboration and competition. Private
child welfare agencies manage a complex portfolio of collaborative, competitive, and co-
opetitive relationships with agencies across diverse child-serving sectors. As agency leaders
manage dual collaborative and competitive pressures and demands, examining whether co-
opetition produces substantial benefits for organizations and families will be key for private
agency leaders, public child welfare administrators, and other stakeholders interested in
system reform.
Acknowledgments
The authors wish to thank their agency partners who assisted with recruitment, and participated in this study. This
research was conducted under the Quality Improvement Center on Privatization of Child Welfare Services funded
by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Administration for Youth and Families, Children’s Bureau.
This research was also partially supported by a national Research Service Award Pre-doctoral/Post-Doctoral
Traineeship (Perez-Jolles) from the Agency for HealthCare Research and Quality sponsored by The Cecil G. Sheps
Center for Health Services Research, The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, Grant No. T32-HS000032.
Dr. Bunger is an investigator with the Implementation Research Institute (IRI), at the George Warren Brown School
of Social Work, Washington University in St. Louis; through an award from the National Institute of Mental Health
(R25 MH080916-01A2) and the Department of Veterans Affairs, Health Services Research & Development
Service, Quality Enhancement Research Initiative (QUERI).
References
Armstrong MI, Swanke JR, Strozier A, Yampolskaya S, Sharrock PJ. Recent changes in the child
welfare system: One state’s experience. Children and Youth Services Review. 2013; 35(10):1712–
1718.10.1016/j.childyouth.2013.07.005
Bailey, D.; Koney, KM. Strategic Alliances Among Health and Human Services Organizations: From
Affiliations to Consolidations. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, Inc; 2000.
Baker WE, Faulkner RR, Fisher GA. Hazards of the market: The continuity and dissolution of
interorganizational market relationships. American Sociological Review. 1998; 63(2):147–
177.10.2307/2657321
Barman EA. Asserting difference: The strategic response of nonprofit organizations to competition.
Social Forces. 2002; 80(4):1191–1222.10.1353/sof.2002.0020
Bengtsson M, Kock S. “Coopetition” in Business Networks—to Cooperate and Compete
Simultaneously. Industrial Marketing Management. 2000; 29(5):411–426.10.1016/
S0019-8501(99)00067-X
Bengtsson, Maria; Kock, S. Cooperation and competition in relationships between competitors in
business networks. Jounral of Business & Industrial Marketing. 1999; 14(13):178–193. doi: http://
dx.doi.org/10.1108/08858629910272184.
Bolland JM, Wilson JV. Three faces of integrative coordination: A model of interorganizational
relations in community-based health and human services. Health Services Research. 1994; 29(3):
341–366. [PubMed: 8063569]
Brandenburger, A.; Nalebuff, BJ. Co-opetition. New York: Doubleday; 1996.
Bunger AC. Administrative Coordination in Nonprofit Human Service Delivery Networks: The Role
of Competition and Trust. Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly. 2013; 42(6):1155–
1175.10.1177/0899764012451369
Bunger et al. Page 16






















Cefola, J.; Brotsky, C.; Hanson, R. Shared Services: A Guide to Creating Collaborative Solutions for
Nonprofits. San Francisco, CA: 2010.
Chen MJ. Reconceptualizing the competition-cooperation relationship: A transparadox perspective.
Journal of Management Inquiry. 2008; 17(4):288–304.10.1177/1056492607312577
Child Welfare Information Gateway. State vs. county administration of child welfare services.
Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Children’s Bureau; 2012.
Collins-Camargo C, Ensign K, Flaherty C. The National Quality Improvement Center on the
Privatization of Child Welfare Services: A Program Description. Research on Social Work
Practice. 2007; 18(1):72–81.10.1177/1049731507303495
Collins-Camargo C, Armstrong MI, McBeath B, Chuang E. Promoting cross-sector partnerships in
child welfare: qualitative results from a five-state strategic planning process. Child Welfare. 2013;
92(1):33–63. [PubMed: 23984485]
Collins-Camargo C, McBeath B, Ensign K. Privatization and Performance-Based Contracting in Child
Welfare: Recent Trends and Implications for Social Service Administrators. Administration in
Social Work. 2011; 35(5):494–516.10.1080/03643107.2011.614531
Fligstein N. Markets as politics: A political-cultural approach to market institutions. American
Sociological Review. 1996; 61(4):656–673.10.2307/2096398
Foster MK, Meinhard AG. A Regression Model Explaining Predisposition to Collaborate. Nonprofit
and Voluntary Sector Quarterly. 2002; 31(4):549–564.10.1177/0899764002238100
Girth AM, Hefetz A, Johnston JM, Warner ME. Outsourcing Public Service Delivery: Management
Responses in Noncompetive Markets. Public Administration Review2. 2012; 72(6):887–
900.10.111/j.1540-6210.2012.02596.x
Gray, B. Collaborating: Finding Common Ground for Multiparty Problems. San Francisco: Jossey-
Bass Inc; 1989.
Guo C, Acar M. Understanding collaboration among nonprofit organizations: Combining resource
dependency, institutional, and network perspectives. Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly.
2005; 34(3):340–361.
Gnyawali DR, Park BJ. Co-opetition and technological innovation in small and medium-sized
enterprsises: A multilevel conceptual model. Journal of Small Business Management. 2009;
47:308–330.
Gnyawali DR, Park BJ. Co-opetition between giants: Collaboration with competitors for technological
innovation. Research Policy. 2011; 40:650–663.
Hunt SD. Competing Through Relationships: Grounding Relationship Marketing in Resource-
Advantage Theory. Journal of Marketing Management. 1997; 13(5):431–445.10.1080/0267257X.
1997.9964484
Hunt SD. Economic growth: should policy focus on investment or dynamic competition? European
Business Review. 2007; 19(4):274–291.10.1108/09555340710760116
Jang HS, Feiock Richard C. Public Versus Private Funding of Nonprofit Organizations: Implications
for Collaboration. Public Performance & Management Review. 2007; 31(2):174–190.
Johnsen MC, Morrissey JP. Structure and change in child mental health service delivery networks.
Journal of Community Psychology. 1996; 24(3):275–289.10.1002/
(SICI)1520-6629(199607)24:3<275::AID-JCOP7>3.0.CO;2-W
Judge W, Ryman J. The shared leadership challenge in strategic alliances: Lesssons from the US
healthcare industry. The Academy of Management Executive. 2001; 15(2):71–79.
Kettner PM, Martin LL. Factors Affecting Competition in State Contracting for Human Services.
Journal of Sociology and Social Welfare. 1989; 16(2):181–194.
Mariani MM. Coopetition as an emergent strategy. International Studies of Management and
Organizations. 2007; 37(2):97–126.10.2753/IMO0020-8825370205
Mascia D, Di Vincenzo F. Dynamics of hospital competition: Social network analysis in the Italian
National Health Service. Health Care Management Review2. 2013; 38(3):234–247.10.1097/HMR.
0b13e31824ccab8
McBeath B, Collins-Camargo C, Chuang E. The role of the private sector in child welfare: Historical
reflections and a contemporary snapshot based on the National Survey of Private Child and Family
Bunger et al. Page 17






















Serving Agencies. Journal of Public Child Weflare. 2012; 6(4):459–
481.10.1080/15548732.2012.701839
McCullough C, Schmitt B. Managed care and privatization: Results of a national survey. Children and
Youth Services Review. 2000; 22(2):117–130.
McEwen, E. Performance-based contracts as a strategy for improving child welfare: Lessons learned
from Illinois. Technical report from the Illinois Department of Children and Family Services;
2006.
Mitchell L, Walters R, Thomas ML, Denniston J, McIntosh H, Brodowski M. The Children’s Bureau’s
Vision for the Future of Child Welfare. Journal of Public Child Welfare. 2012; 6(4):550–
567.10.1080/15548732.2012.715267
Mosley JE. Institutionalization, privatization, and political opportunity: What tactical choices reveal
about the policy advocacy of human service nonprofits. Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly.
2011; 40(3):435–457.10.1177/0899764009346335
Park SH, Russo MV. When Competition Eclipses Cooperation: An Event History Analysis of Joint
Venture Failure. Management Science. 1996; 42(6):875–890. 0025-1909/96/4206/0875.
Peng TJA, Bourne M. The Coexistence of Competition and Cooperation between Networks:
Implications from Two Taiwanese Healthcare Networks. British Journal of Management. 2009;
20(3):377–400.10.1111/j.1467-8551.2008.00565.x
Pfeffer, J.; Salancik, GR. The external control of organizations: A resource dependence perspective.
Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press; 2003. 2nd Print
Provan KG, Milward HB. A preliminary theory of interorganizational network effectiveness: A
comparative study of four community mental health systems. Administrative Science Quarterly1.
1995; 40(1):1–33.
Quintana-Garcia C, Benavides-Velasco CA. Cooperation, competition, and innovative capability: a
panel data of European dedicated biotechnology firms. Technovation. 2004; 24(12):927–938.
Reitan TC. Theories of interorganizational relations in the human services. Social Service Review.
1998; 9:285–309.
Rivard JC, Morrisey J. Factors Associated with Interagency Coordination in a Child Mental Health
Service System Demonstration. Administration and Policy in Mental Health and Mental Health
Services Research. 2003; 30(5):397–415.10.1023/A:1024641630430 [PubMed: 12940683]
Romzek BS, LeRoux K, Johnston J, Kempf RJ, Piatak JS. Informal accountability in multisector
service delivery collaborations. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory. 2013:1–
29.
Shortell, SM.; Gillies, R.; Anderson, DA.; Erickson, KM.; Mitchell, JB. Remaking Health Care in
America: The Evolutionof Organized Delivery Systems. 2. San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass; 2000.
Smith, S.; Lipsky, M. Nonprofits for Hire: The Welfare State in the Age of Contracting. Cambridge,
MA: Harvard University Press; 1993.
Smith SR, Smyth J. Contracting for services in a decentralized system. Journal of Public
Administration Research and Theory. 1996; 6(2):277–296.
Snavely K, Tracy MB. Development of Trust in Rural Nonprofit Collaborations. Nonprofit and
Voluntary Sector Quarterly. 2002; 31(1):62–83.10.1177/0899764002311003
Snijders TAB, Borgatti SP. Non-parametric standard errors and tests for network statistics.
Connections. 1999; 22(2):61–70.
StataCorp.. Stata Statistical Software: Release 12. College Station, TX: StataCorp LP; 2011.
Tuckman HP. Competition, commercialization, and the evolution of nonprofit organizational
structures. Journal of Policy Analysis and Management. 1998; 17(2):175–194. doi:http://
dx.doi.org/10.1002/(SICI)1520-6688(199821)17:2<175::AID-PAM4>3.0.CO;2-E.
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Administration for Children, Youth and Families.
National Survey of Child and Adolescent Well-Being: Local Child Welfare Agency Survey:
Report. Washington, DC: Jun. 2011
U.S. Government Accountability Office. Child Welfare: HHS could play a greater role in helping child
welfare agencies recruit, and retain staff. United States General Accounting Office. Report to
Congressional Requesters. 2003. Retrieved from http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d03357.pdf
Bunger et al. Page 18






















Valente, TW. Social networks and health: models, methods, and applications. Oxford University Press;
2010.
Valente TW, Coronges KA, Stevens GD, Cousineau MR. Collaboration and competition in a
children’s health initiative coalition: a network analysis. Evaluation and program planning. 2008;
31(4):392–402.10.1016/j.evalprogplan.2008.06.002 [PubMed: 18639933]
Waldfogel J. Rethinkinking the paradigm for child protection. The Future of Children. 1998; 8(1):104–
119. [PubMed: 9676003]
Wells R. Managing child welfare agencies: What do we know about what works? Children and Youth
Services Review. 2006; 28(10):1181–1194.10.1016/j.childyouth.2005.11.009
Wholey DR, Huonker JW. Effects of generalism and niche overlap on network linkages among youth
service agencies. The Academy of Management Journal. 1993; 36(2):349–371.10.2307/256526
Zuckerman AM. Clobber - or collaborate? Taking a fresh look at your competition. Healthcare
Financial Management. 2006 Nov.:68–72. [PubMed: 17094279]
Bunger et al. Page 19























• Private child welfare agencies commonly manage competition, collaboration,
and co-opetition.
• Co-opetition is most common around service delivery functions, with other local
private child welfare agencies.
• Having a sub-contract or high-quality relationship is related to co-opetition.
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Distribution of Relationship Types by Organizational Function
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Table 1
Summary Statistics for Agencies
Variable N Mean (SD)/Percent Range
Organizational Characteristics
 Age (years) 445 62.63 (49.34) 2–212
 For-profit 436 8.4% 0–1
 Staff size 445 4.46 (1.81) 1–9a
Environmental Features
 Rural 444 38.7% 0–1
 Suburban 444 59.7% 0–1
 Metropolitan 444 65.1% 0–1
 County-Administered 446 46.4% 0–1
a
Response categories are as follows: 1= “Fewer than 10 FTEs”, 2= “Between 10–24 FTEs”, 3= “Between 25–49 FTEs”, 4= “Between 50–99
FTEs”, 5= “Between 100–249 FTEs”, 6= “Between 250–499 FTEs”, 7= “Between 500–749”, 8= “Between 750–999 FTEs”, and 9= “1,000 or
more FTEs”.
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Table 2
Summary Statistics for Dyads
Variable N Mean (SD)/Percent Range
Collaboration
 Overall 4151 87.3%
  Data Sharing 4075 80.6% 0–1
  Joint Service Delivery 4015 75.8% 0–1
  Joint Budgeting 3906 35.2% 0–1
  Staff Cross Training 3906 56.2% 0–1
Competition 4460 73.7% 0–1
Relational Features
 Contract 4460 33.5% 0–1
 Relationship Quality 4278 3.96 (.77) 1–5
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